The past few years have seen several works establishing PAC frameworks for solving various problems in economic domains; these include optimal auction design, approximate optima of submodular functions, stable partitions and payoff divisions in cooperative games and more. In this work, we provide a unified learningtheoretic methodology for modeling these problems, and establish some useful tools for determining whether a given economic solution concept can be learned from data. Our learning theoretic framework generalizes a notion of function space dimension -the graph dimension -adapting it to the solution concept learning domain. We identify sufficient conditions for the PAC learnability of solution concepts, and show that results in existing works can be immediately derived using our general methodology. Finally, we apply our methods in other economic domains, yielding a novel notion of PAC competitive equilibrium and PAC Condorcet winners.
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a widespread application of learning-theoretic notions in economic domains. Rather than assuming full knowledge of the underlying domain (or a prior over domain instantiations), one assumes access to partial data (e.g. a historical dataset), and employs learningtheoretic tools in order to obtain approximate solutions. Consider the following simple example: we wish to find the maximum of a function f : R n → R; however, we do not have access to f , but rather to a dataset of the form ì
x 1 , f (ì x 1 ) , . . . , ì
x m , f (ì x m ) . One way would be to use classic learning-theoretic tools [Anthony and Bartlett, 1999] , learn an approximation f * of f , and compute the maximum of f * . This is a rather complex approach, whose success depends on the hypothesis class that f belongs to (whether f is a linear function, a cubic polynomial, a two-layer neural network etc.), and on the robustness of the approximation. However, the reader may note that a much simpler solution is available: if the number of samples is sufficiently large, taking the empirical maximum of f over the dataset -i.e. ì
x * ∈ argmax j { f (ì x j ) : j ∈ [m]} -yields a point that is likely to be greater in value than any future point sampled from the same distribution as the original dataset. The idea behind this example is simple: rather than approximating the underlying model structure and computing solutions over it, which may be costly, try to learn solutions directly from data. Recent works have applied this concept to classic optimization problems, as well as game-theoretic domains. These lines of work have progressed more or less independently, proving that solutions in a specific problem domain can (or cannot) be efficiently inferred from data; however, there has been no attempt to provide a unified theory of learning solution concepts from data. This is where our work comes in. Before we proceed, let us highlight an important motivation to learning solutions directly from data. A naive approach to inferring solutions from data would be to learn an approximate model (e.g. learn a function f * which approximates f in the maximization example above), and then try generating solutions for the approximate model. However, as has been shown in the literature, learning an approximate model may be:
(1) insufficient for generating 'good' solutions (this is the case for the core in hedonic games ]) (2) requires an exponential number of samples, whereas directly learning solutions is easy. Indeed, finding a payoff in the core of TU games is easy [Balcan et al., 2015b , while PAC learning cooperative games requires an exponential number of samples ; this is also the case for finding an empirical maximum in the example above.
Our Contributions
We begin by establishing a learning-theoretic framework for learning solution concepts from data.
The key difference is that, generally speaking, solution concepts do not inhabit the same space as the samples that one observes. For example, in the case learning an approximate maximum, the function space is R R n , whereas the solution space is simply R n . This is a generalization of the classic notion of PAC learning, where one is given sample values from an unknown function f , and wishes to find an approximation f * of f belonging to the same space. In Section 3, we define a notion of solution dimension: this is a quantity that depends on the hypothesis class of the sampled function, and the complexity of the underlying solution space. Our solution dimension generalizes the graph dimension in classic PAC learning, and serves a similar purpose: if a solution concept learning problem has a low graph solution dimension, a distributionbased solution can be efficiently learned. We introduce a technique of solution concept shattering to prove bounds on the generalized graph dimension: our argument draws on ideas from shattering bounds for the VC dimension of binary hypothesis classes. We also show that the existence of a consistent solution and a low graph dimension are sufficient conditions for the PAC learning solutions, showing simpler technical arguments for solution concept learnability in existing works, as well as paving the way for a straightforward approach to learnability of other solution concepts. Next, we apply our methodology to immediately derive some of the results in the literature. In particular, we show that the generalized graph dimension of the core in TU coooperative games and hedonic games is low, immediately implying that the PAC variants of the core in both TU cooperative games and hedonic games can be efficiently learned using a polynomial number of samples, assuming that there exists an efficient algorithm that finds a solution consistent with the samples. We use our methodology to derive results for new distribution-based solution concepts: a new notion of distribution-based competitive equilibrium, and a distribution-based Condorcet winner. We identify some sufficient conditions and relaxations that allow distribution-based competitive equilibria to be learned from data; similarly, we show that distribution-based Condorcet winners can be learned efficiently from data under structured preference profiles such as top-responsive and single-crossing preferences. We also identify a simple condition on the underlying tournament graph that bounds the sample complexity of finding a distribution-based Condorcet winner using a polynomial number of samples.
Our work provides a general framework for learning distribution-based solution concepts, and applies it in a variety of economic domains in Section 5; thus, we have made each subsection in Section 5 self-contained: we provide all necessary definitions of the relevant economic models (cooperative games, competitive equilibria and Condorcet winners) within the relevant sections.
Related Work
Several recent works propose and analyze statistical learning in game-theoretic problems. The most recent lines of work are on cooperative games 
CLASSIC PAC LEARNING
We begin with a brief overview of the PAC learning model; a reader familiar with the basic definitions of PAC learning can proceed to Section 3. A learning problem is defined over an instance space X and a set of functions (ie. hypothesis class) H ⊆ Y X . Our objective is to find a learning algorithm that observes a training sample of m points labeled by some hidden function f ∈ H, is said to be PAC-learnable if there exists a PAC learning algorithm whose sample complexity is polynomial in 1 ϵ , 1 δ and natural problem parameters (e.g. if X = R n , it is often natural to assume that L is polynomial in n). Note that in order to have efficient PAC learnability, one must have that L runs in time polynomial in 1 ϵ , 1 δ and the natural problem parameters. For binary hypothesis classes H ⊂ {0, 1} X , the VC dimension [Vapnik and Chervonenkis, 1971] characterizes the sample complexity of a hypothesis class H. The sample complexity required by any PAC learning algorithm for H is upper and lower-bounded by the VC dimension of H. In fact, this can be achieved by an algorithm that always outputs a consistent hypothesis, i.e. if the sample is (
Definition 2.1. For a hypothesis class H, a set C ⊆ X is said to be shattered if for any binary labeling b : C → {0, 1} there exists some h ∈ H such that h(x) = b(x) for all x ∈ C. The VC dimension of H, or VC(H), is the size of the largest set C ⊆ X that is shattered by H.
For example, if the hypothesis class is the set of all linear classifiers over R n , its VC dimension is O(n) [Anthony and Bartlett, 1999] . Theorem 2.2 relates the VC dimension and the PAC learnability of H.
T 2.2. There exists absolute constants α 1 and α 2 , such that for a hypothesis class H, the sample complexity of H with respect to ϵ and δ (denoted m(ϵ, δ )) is
Theorem 2.2 has an equivalent uniform convergence interpretation: if two functions f , ∈ H agree on an i.i.d. sample of more than α 2 ϵ log 1 ϵ VC(H) + log 1 δ points, then Pr
We define the empirical loss of h with respect to a sample of m points
more generally, the statistical loss of h with respect to some distribution D over X, and some function f :
, for any f : X → {0, 1} and a distribution D over X:
We often distinguish between cases where there exists some hypothesis h * ∈ H that can fit f exactly over D, and those where every hypothesis h ∈ H fits f with some error. In the former case (also known as the realizable case) there exists some h * ∈ H such that Pr x ∼D [h * (x) f (x)] = 0; in the latter case (also known as the agnostic case), the observed values could come from any arbitrary function f in 2 X . However, as a result of the uniform convergence results, it if possible to show that if an algorithm is able to minimize the empirical risk, ie. find h ∈ L T (h, f ) h ∈H , the statistical error is still minimized within a tolerance of ϵ. Therefore, as discussed in , uniform convergence is a powerful tool for bounding statistical loss.
A PAC FRAMEWORK FOR DISTRIBUTION-BASED SOLUTION CONCEPTS
Departing from the classic PAC framework in Section 2, we now describe our learning-theoretic model for distribution-based solution concepts. Throughout the paper, we will often use the no-tationÕ(q) to denote a running time that is bounded by a constant times q, with an additional polynomial dependency on 1 ε and 1 δ omitted.
Distribution-Based Solution Concepts
For various game-theoretic and economic models (which we refer to in this work simply as games), a solution concept or an equilibrium concept characterizes that subset of its solution space which satisfies some natural desiderata. For example, Nash equilibria are a subset of all possible mixed strategy profiles for which no player can strictly gain by unilaterally switching their strategy. In cooperative game theory, a solution is said to be in the core of a particular game if there is no subset of players that benefits by deviating from it. In voting theory, given a particular preference profile of voters over the candidates, a Condorcet winner is a candidate who would win the pairwise election against any other candidate. More generally speaking, for a class of games G with solution space S, a solution concept is a map F : G → 2 S , associating to every game a subset of solutions.
Games can be thought of as mappings from some domain X to a label space Y. For example, in TU cooperative games, a game is a function : 2 N → R mapping from subsets of the player set N to real values, i.e. X = 2 N and Y = R. In markets and competitive equilibria, a game would be a list of player valuations i : 2 G → R assigning a value i (S) to every bundle of goods S ⊆ G. As we discuss in the introduction, we have no knowledge of the actual game , except for the hypothesis class it belongs to; we only get to observe samples of the game's evaluation on some points in X.
The logical constraints that characterize a solution concept often take the form of a universal quantification of some predicate over the game domain. For example, for TU cooperative games, let us define a local loss function λ : 2 N × G × R n → {0, 1}, where λ(S, , ì x) = 0 iff S ∈ 2 N does not benefit by deviating from ì
x for a game with characteristic function (i.e. (S) ≥ i ∈S x i ). The core can be naturally written as:
Similarly, if we interpret the maxima of a function as a solution concept, we can define it using a universal quantification over its domain:
Whenever a solution concept can be defined in this manner, we can define its distributional variant by relaxing the universal quantification; instead, we require that the expected loss as measured by λ is low, with respect to a distribution D over the domain X; i.e. Pr
x ∼D [λ(x, , s) = 0] ≥ 1 − ϵ, for some error threshold ϵ ∈ (0, 1).
Definition 3.1. An instance of the S S problem (denoted with Ψ) is given by the tuple Ψ = (X Ψ , Y Ψ , G Ψ , S Ψ , λ Ψ ); we omit the problem space Ψ subscript when it is clear from context. Here:
• X is the instance space.
• Y is the codomain (or label) space.
• G ⊆ Y X is the function space: this is simply the relevant class of games.
• S is the solution space.
• The function λ : X × G × S → {0, 1} measures local loss.
If we take G = S, and a local loss function given by λ(x, 0 , 1 ) = 0 ⇐⇒ 0 (x) = 1 (x) for 0 , 1 ∈ G, then we recover the standard PAC learning definitions in Section 2. In standard PAC learning, the hypothesis space corresponds to the underlying function space as well as to the learned solution. We similarly define solution-based variants of of statistical error and empirical error. For a hidden game ∈ G, and a sample of m points T = (x j , (x j )) m j=1 , we define the empirical error (or empirical risk) as
and the statistical error (or statistical risk) as
Consistent Solvers and Barriers of Indistinguishability
In standard PAC learning, consistent or empirical risk minimizing (ERM) solvers play an important role; these are algorithms that minimize empirical error on the training sample. As discussed in Section 2, for binary functions, consistent algorithms also behave as PAC learners whose sample complexity depends on the VC dimension of the hypothesis class. Another important result shows that for any PAC learnable hypothesis class, there exists a randomized algorithm for consistent learning with comparable time complexity [Kearns and Vazirani, 1994] . We define the a notion of consistency for solution concepts and prove a corresponding result for randomized consistent solvers. 
P
. We construct a randomized consistent solver given a PAC solver L, which outputs a consistent solution with probability ≥ 2 3 . It is easy to construct a solver that outputs such a solution with an arbitrarily higher probability using one that outputs one with any constant probability. (Here we use 2 3 , corresponding to the definition of RP complexity class.) Given m input samples T m labeled with some ∈ G, we provide a construction for T m ′ for passing to the PAC solver subroutine. Let the consistent solver define a distribution D uniformly over the multiset T m . The solver then invokes the PAC solver with ε 0 = 1 2m and δ = 1 3 , by sampling the points x j ∈ T m from T m with this distribution (i.e. uniformly). Observe that for any solution s ∈ S, if there is some
This implies that for all ∈ G and T m = (x, (x)) m ,
In other words, the algorithm returns a solution s * which has zero empirical loss with high probability.
The definition of consistent solving presents a subtle yet crucial departure from the corresponding result in standard PAC learning. In PAC learning, since λ(x, , h) = ½[ (x) = h(x)], if there are two functions 0 , 1 ∈ G such that 0 (x) = 1 (x) for a point x ∈ X, then for any hypothesis h: λ(x, 0 , h) = λ(x, 1 , h). Therefore, even if there are two functions 0 , 1 ∈ G which could generate
then it is consistent with both 0 and 1 . In fact, this implies that, time complexity considerations aside, a consistent algorithm always exists in standard learning: it is possible to find a consistent hypothesis via exhaustively searching through the entire hypothesis class. This, however, may not always be true in solution concept learning.
The key issue is as follows: for solution concepts, it is possible for two functions 0 , 1 ∈ G generating an equivalent sample
to disagree on a solution; a solution s * may be consistent with respect to 0 but not 1 . Indeed, a similar result yields non-existence of a PAC core solution for additive hedonic games . In both cases, a solution is guaranteed to exist for the underlying game, but a solver cannot identify it with arbitrarily high probability. Intuitively, the reason that this occurs is that game-theoretic solutions often have to treat regions of players' preferences that are completely unobserved in the data. For example, in market equilibria, one must inevitably set prices for unobserved goods, and assign goods to players without knowing what their value for those goods might be; in hedonic games, a partition of players may contain subsets that are completely unobserved in the data. Therefore, Theorem 3.4 imposes a necessary criterion on PAC Solvability, which is the guaranteed existence of consistent solutions.
Ψ is said to satisfy the consistent solvability criterion if for all C ⊆ X, and for all f : C → Y, there exists some s ∈ S such that
In this section, we present novel definitions of dimension for the PAC solution setting. In particular, we provide a notion of dimension that upper bounds the intrinsic complexity of game-theoretic solutions, as well as a shattering argument for establishing that bound in specific instances; this shattering argument will be used later in Section 5.
An Upper Bound on Sample Complexity via the ERM Principle
We now turn to presenting an upper bound on the sample complexity of solution learning, via the graph dimension of Ψ.
Definition 4.1 (Solution-based Graph Dimension). Given some C ⊆ X, we say the set C is Gshattered in Ψ if there exists a ∈ G, such that for every binary labeling b : C → {0, 1} there exists a solution s ∈ S (that may depend on b) such that for all x ∈ C, λ(x, , s) = b(x). The Solution-based graph dimension of Ψ, denoted Sd G (Ψ), is the size of the largest set G-shattered in Ψ, and (C, ) as the corresponding shattering witness.
Indeed, the graph dimension Sd G (Ψ) serves as an upper bound on the PAC sample complexity of consistent solvers for Ψ. But we first prove a stronger claim, using the uniform convergence discussed in 2.3. We show that if we define the sample complexity for uniform convergence m UC (ϵ, δ ) as the number of samples required such that the empirical loss of any solution is ϵ-close to its statistical loss, then m UC is dependent on the generalized graph dimension of the problem. 
samples (for the appropriate constant α, then (where L ϕ T and L ϕ D denote the corresponding loss functions for binary functions):
. By substituting the loss functions in Eq (1), and taking f = ½, we get:
. If a solution is consistent, then we also know that ∃s * : ∀ ∈ G| T : ϕ ,s * = ½ ∈ Φ . The second part of the statement similarly follows from the upper bound of m PAC for binary functions in Theorem 2.2.
As a useful sanity check, we observe that Sd G collapses to the classic VC dimension: when S = G = H ⊆ 2 X , then Sd G (Ψ) = VC(H). Similarly, when S = G = H ⊆ Y X , for some Y, Sd G collapses to the Graph dimension for multi-valued functions , Natarajan, 1989 . We now observe few immediate corollaries of the above uniform convergence result. C 4.3. If for a common X Ψ , Y Ψ , G Ψ , and S Ψ : (Simultaneous Constraints) If there are multiple local constraints λ 1 , ...λ k that need to be simulta-
such that we need to bound their conjunction within ε, i.e.
(Bounded Disjunctions) If there are local constraints λ 1 , ...λ k for some constant k, such that we need to bound their disjunction within ε, i.e.
The proof of Corollary 4.3 is relegated to the appendix. 1 Recall that theÕ(·) notation omits polynomial dependencies on 1 ϵ and 1 δ . C 4.4 (G A ). For any class of functions G ⊆ Y X and S = X, where Y is endowed with a total order ≻, then the solution-based Gdim for λ(x, ≻, x * ) = ½[ (x) ≻ (x * )] is 1.
Therefore, a PAC argmax solver exists with sample complexity 1 ε lo 1 δ . P
. Let us assume that a set
. However, since is transitive, this leads to contradiction.
As discussed in Section 3, the applicability of Theorem 4.2 and its corollaries for PAC learning is conditioned by the existence of a consistent solver, which may not always exist. To conclude, in order to establish an efficient PAC algorithm for a problem Ψ, it suffices to upperbound m(Ψ) by its generalized graph dimension Sd G (Ψ). In what follows, we show how this technique can be used to establish the PAC learnability of various solution concepts from the EconCS literature.
Uniform Convergence Beyond Consistency
As discussed in Section 2, sample complexity bounds for uniform convergence can also be used to bound the sample complexity for Agnostic PAC learning with Empirical Risk Minimizers (ERM learners). However, in the case of PAC solving there are multiple possible definitions that can correspond to agnostic learning. We discuss two of these, and show that for both of these definitions the corresponding notion of ERM Solving has a sample complexity that follows from uniform convergence. 
4.6. The sample complexity for Worst-case and Bayesian Agnostic PAC Solving for an instance of S S Ψ, for respective Empirical Risk Minimizers, is inÕ(Sd G (Ψ)).
The proof of Corollary 4.6 is relegated to the appendix.
THE SAMPLE COMPLEXITY OF GAME-THEORETIC DISTRIBUTION-BASED SOLUTION CONCEPTS
Let us consider some examples from recent literature. While the focus of this paper is on gametheoretic solutions, our theory applies for other types of solution concepts as long as they satisfy the local verification property: one can define a local loss function λ that depends only on a given point in X, ∈ G and the solution s ∈ S (see Section 3). All problems described below follow a common theme: we are not interested in learning the functions themselves, but in generating solutions that satisfy certain constraints with respect to the function, using the sampled dataset.
The PAC Core for TU Cooperative Games
A transferable utility (TU) cooperative game is given by a tuple N , , where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players, and : 2 N → R + is a function mapping every subset S ⊆ N to a value (S) ∈ R + . We are interested in finding "good" payoff divisions for the game. These are simply vectors ì x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n + satisfying efficiency -n i =1 x i = (N ) -and individual rationality x i ≥ ({i}) for all i ∈ N -properties. One notable cooperative solution concept is the core. We say that a coalition S ⊆ N blocks a payoff division ì
x if i ∈S x i < (S); that is, the coalition S can guarantee its members a strictly higher reward should they choose to break off from working with everyone else. The core is the (possibly empty) set of payoff divisions from which no coalition can deviate; in other words, core(N ,
Deciding whether the core is empty, let alone identifying an element in core(N , ) is a computationally intractable problem [Chalkiadakis et al., 2011] . However, propose a learning-based approach. Given a distribution D over 2 N , a payoff division ì
In what follows, we provide a proof for the PAC stabilizability of TU cooperative games in the language of Theorem 4.2; direct proofs of this fact appear in [Balcan et al., 2015b .
T 5.1. TU cooperative games can be efficiently PAC stabilized, using onlyÕ(n) samples.
P . Let us compute Sd for the PAC core of cooperative games; we show that any set of > n coalitions cannot be G shattered as per Definition 4.1. Taking a set of coalitions S = {S 1 , . . . , S m }, it is G shattered if there is some TU cooperative game : S → R + such that for all T ⊆ S, there exists some vector ì x * in R n such that for all T ∈ T , (T ) ≥ x ( T ), and for all S ∈ S \ T , (S) < x * (S). Let us bound the dimension m of S. The problem is equivalent to shattering sets of vectors in the hypercube {0, 1} n with linear classifiers, which is well-known to be impossible for sets of size > n [ Anthony and Bartlett, 1999] . We conclude that d G for the PAC core of TU cooperative games is ≤ n.
We note that the solution computed in Balcan et al. [2015b] is only efficient (i.e. with n i =1 x i = (N )) if the core of the cooperative game is not empty. In the case where the game has an empty core, the solution computed still satisfies the core constraints with high probability with respect to D, but may not be efficient. However, the payoff outputted is using the minimal subsidy required in order to stabilize the game. In other words, the total payoff is no more than the cost of stability of the underlying game [Bachrach et al., 2018] . The efficiency requirement is rather important to maintain: without it, one can "cheat" and pay each player some arbitrarily high amount, thus guaranteeing that the underlying game is stable.
The PAC Core for Hedonic Games
Hedonic cooperative games [Brandt et al., 2016, Chapter 15] operate under a mildly different assumption that their TU counterparts: each player i ∈ N has a complete, transitive preference order ≻ i over coalitions in N that contain her. Here, solutions are partitions of N , rather than payoff vectors in R n as in Section 5.1, and any partition is said to 'blocked' by a coalition S ⊆ N if all members of S prefer it over the coalition assigned to them by the partition. The core of a hedonic game is the set of stable partitions: these are partitions that cannot be blocked by any coalition S ⊆ N . It is often assumed that players' preferences over subsets are induced by a cardinal utility function i : 2 N → R + . In the language of PAC solving, we can define the objective of the problem of PAC core stabilizing with respect to a distribution D ∈ ∆(2 N ) as finding a partition (or a coalitional structure) π : N → 2 N (where i ∈ π (i) for every i ∈ N ), such that
Here the local constraint can be seen as a function λ over coalitions X = 2 N , space G of underlying utility functions v = ( 1 , ..., N ) and space of partitions S ⊂ 2 N N , such that:
First, we bound Sd for hedonic games using the graph shattering argument. In other words, we show the following claim: there cannot exist a set of m > N coalitions S = {S 1 , . . . , S m }, where S 1 , . . . , S m ⊆ N , and a hedonic game ì ∈ H , such that for all T ⊆ S, there exists some partition π * of N such that for every set T ∈ T , T does not block π * , but every set S ∈ S \ T blocks π * .
L 5.2. For any class of Hedonic Games H over n players, the graph dimension of the problem of PAC stabilizing H is ≤ n.
P
. By definition, for a given hedonic game h ∈ H , a partition π , and a coalition S ⊆ N , the local loss λ(S, h, π ) = 0 if and only if there exists a player in S that does not prefer it over her assigned coalition in π , or:
If a set of m coalitions S = {S 1 , . . . , S m } is G-shattered with witness h ∈ H , then we know that for each S j ∈ S, there exists a coalition structure π j such that λ(S j , h, π j ) = 0, but λ(S k , h, π j ) = 1 for all k j. In other words, under π j , there exists some i ∈ S j such that i (S j ) < i (π j (i)), and for all k j and for all i ∈ S k , i (S k ) ≥ i (π j (i)). We conclude that for every S j ∈ S, there exists a player i who strictly prefers all coalitions that she belongs to in S \ {S j } over S j . More formally, we let T (i) be the set of coalitions which are least preferred by player i in S; note that T (i) must be a singleton, or else we arrive at a contradiction (the least liked coalition must be unique). Therefore, if S is G-shattered, the number of coalitions in S is bounded by n, the number of players, and we are done.
Applying Theorem 4.2 and leveraging Lemma 5.2 we obtain the following result: T 5.3. A class of Hedonic games H is efficiently PAC stabilizable if and only if there exists an algorithm that outputs a consistent partition over any batch evaluated by some game ∈ H ; the sample complexity in this case isÕ(n).
In particular, propose such an algorithm for top-responsive hedonic games [Brandt et al., 2016, Chapter 15] ; Igarashi et al. [2019] present an algorithm for hedonic games whose underlying interaction graph is a tree (see also [Igarashi and Elkind, 2016] ). Indeed, given Theorem 5.3, it suffices to show that the algorithms they propose are consistent; their correctness is immediately implied by our results.
PAC Competitive Equilibria
Moving towards the realm of fair allocation, let us now turn to competitive equilibria. We are given a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, and a set of k indivisible goods G = { 1 , . . . , k }. Each player i ∈ N has a valuation function over bundles of goods in G, given by i : 2 G → R + . We assume that i (∅) = 0 for all i ∈ N . A competitive equilibrium is a tuple π , ì p , where: π is a partition of G into n disjoint bundles (some of them may be empty), where π (i) is the bundle assigned to player i; ì p ∈ R n is a price vector, denoting the price of each item in G.
The definition could also be extended similarly for k divisible goods, where we have value functions i : [0, 1] G → R + for every i ∈ N , and bundle assignments π : N → [0, 1] G . (Note that even if for every good j there is some some positive quantity of the good, q j , we can normalize all our value functions and solutions so that the quantity of every good is 1). We consider two variants of competitive equilibria; these correspond to scenarios where players enter the market with some endowment of goods that needs to redistributed (this is the case for many models studied in [Nisan et al., 2007, Chapters 6 and 9] ), and scenarios where players have a budget, but money acts as a medium for allocation, and has no intrinsic worth in itself (e.g., in course allocation mechanisms [Budish, 2011] ). Markets where money has an intrinsic value are sometimes referred to as exchange economies; markets where money has no intrinsic value and players have budgets are also known as Fisher markets. In Fisher markets, we assume that each player i has a budget β i ∈ R + ; it is sometimes assumed that all players have an equal budget -this is referred to as a competitive equilibrium from equal incomes -though this is not strictly necessary. In exchange economies with divisible goods, we assume that each player has an initial endowment of goods ì e i ∈ [0, 1] k , denoting the (divisible) amount of each good that she possesses. What bundles of goods can players demand given item prices? Given an outcome π , ì p , let the affordable set of player i be
is simply the set of all bundles that are within i's budget. Similarly, for exchange economies the affordable set can be defined as the set of all divisible goods whose total price is less than the total amount of money that player i gains by selling all of its initial endowment.
An outcome π , ì p is a competitive equilibrium if
In other words, π (i) is one of the most valued bundles that player i can afford given their budget. Both types of competitive equilibrium readily admit a PAC variant; we define the variant for the latter case, though the former case is defined as easily. If we define the dominance set as the upper set of bundles, strongly preferred by player i than π (i) : P i (π ) = {S ⊆ G : i (π (i)) ≥ i (S)} . Then, informally, while a competitive equilibrium is some outcome that ensures that the intersection of dominance set and affordable set is empty, whereas in the statistical problem we want to ensure that the intersection has a low measure under given distribution D. Or equivalently, that the outcome is within some space of small measure from the Pareto frontier. As described in Section 3, we define the PAC CE problem in terms of a local constraint λ i for every player:
And therefore the objective of the statistical problem of finding a PAC CE with respect to a distribution D ∈ ∆(G) is to find an outcome π , ì p such that (with likelihood ≥ 1 − δ ) the likelihood of a bundle that is both affordable and preferable for any player is minimized within ε.
Lemma 5.4 shows that the sample complexity for PAC learning, m PAC (ε, δ ), for this problem is inÕ(k). Therefore, by Theorem 4.2 and Corollary 4.3, any algorithm that generates an outcome consistent against m sampled bundles would also be a PAC CE solver with sample complexity inÕ(k). Note that a consistent solution here refers to an outcome π * , ì p * such that for every bundle S in the observed sample, S is either not affordable at prices ì p * (for input budget vector ì β = (β 1 , . . . , β n ) ∈ R n + ) or the assigned bundle π * (i) is weakly preferred to S. L 5.4. A consistent algorithm for the competitive equilibrium solution is a PAC Solver withÕ(k) sample complexity.
P
. For every player i ∈ N , the local constraint λ i can be seen as a conjunction of
From the definition of an affordable set, given a price vector ì p and budget constraint β i , it is the subset of all bundles satisfying the linear inequality j ∈S p j ≤ β i . Therefore, any set that can be G-shattered for λ 1,i , can be VC shattered by linear separators. Therefore, the graph dimension is bounded by k, which is the VC dimension of linear classifiers over 2 G (or, for divisible goods, [0, 1] G ). For every i, λ 2,i is simply an argmax constraint, and by Corollary 4.4, the graph dimension of argmax is bounded by 1. Consequently, by applying Corollary 4.3, for every λ i the corresponding sample complexity for uniform convergence is m PAC i (ε, δ ) ∈Õ(k), and the uniform convergence of the overall problem is also m PAC (ε, δ ) ∈Õ(k).
While it is possible to bound the sample complexity for the PAC CE problems toÕ(k) (i.e. constant in the number of goods), the challenge is to design algorithms that can generate market clearing solutions: bundle assignments and prices that ensure that all observed goods have been allocated, and there is non-positive excess demand or assignment. We show the existence of consistent solutions in two different settings; however, our solutions require us to relax some of the market constraints. For Fisher markets with indivisible goods and unequal budget levels ì β, for any ζ > 0, there exists a perturbed budget vector ì β * with ì β * − ì β ∞ ≤ ζ for which there exists a solution π * , ì p * that is consistent with any set of sampled bundles. This result holds for any class of valuation functions.
T 5.5. Suppose we are given m sampled bundles S 1 , . . . , S m ⊆ G, and player valuations over the bundles. If we know players' budget levels ì β, then for any ζ > 0, there exists a perturbation on ì β, ì β * such that with ì β − ì β * ∞ < ζ , for which there exists an outcome π * , ì p * such that players with budget levels ì β * do not demand S 1 , . . . , S m ; moreover, i ∈N π * (i) − ì 1 2 ≤ k 2 , where ì 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ [0, 1] k .
. Let us restrict ourselves to finding an assignment using only the sampled bundles and the empty bundle, i.e. for all i ∈ N : π (i) ∈ {∅, S 1 , . . . , S m }. This allows us to avoid making any assumptions about the behavior of i on unobserved bundles. Budish [2011] (Theorem 1) shows that for any preference profile over 2 G , and vector of budget levels ì β such that max i β i > min i β i , then for any ζ > 0 there exists a perturbed budget vector ì β * and outcome π * , ì p * for which: (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ [0, 1] k . Applying this result over observed preferences over {∅, S 1 , . . . , S m } (assuming that for every other S {∅, S 1 , . . . , S m }, i (S) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N ), we show the existence of a competitive equilibrium (under perturbed budgets, and low excess assignment) that is preferred to every other affordable observed bundle in S 1 , . . . , S m , and is therefore consistent.
Theorem 5.5 relies on a classic result from Budish [2011] , which utilizes a fixed-point theorem by Cromme and Diener [1991] for discontinuous maps to bound the excess demand. Thus, it is not constructive; however, the reader will note that Theorem 5.5 does not make any assumptions about the underlying player valuations. For an exchange economy with divisible goods and endowments E i n i =1 , for convex preferences, there exists a solution π * , ì p * with non-positive excess assignment (but potentially leaving some goods unassigned).
T 5.6. Suppose we are given an exchange economy for divisible goods with convex preferences and without undesirable goods. We observe m sampled bundles T = { ì b 1 , . . . , ì b m } and player valuations over the bundles, along with player endowments ì e 1 , . . . , ì e n ; there exists a solution π * , ì p * such that every player i is assigned a bundle they can afford given their endowment, which is consistent (against any possible valuation functions that could have generated the observed values).
. Without loss of generality, let us work with the reduced space of only observed goods. Let U denote the underlying space of convex preferences from which we draw player preferences over assignments. Let U |i,T denote the space of all valuation functions u that satisfy the observed values,
. Since prices only need to satisfy the affordability criterion for every player, i.e. ì p * · π (i) ≤ ì p * · ì e i , we can normalize and assume that prices belong to the simplex ∆ n−1 . Also, observe that the absence of undesirable goods implies that in any consistent solution the price of any observed good cannot be 0. Now let us define the demand set function as D :
We observe that under convex preferences (i.e. quasi-concave utility functions), for every u, ì p and ì e, D(u, ì p, ì e) is a convex and compact body; in addition, D is continuous in ì p. Define, for every
is the set of all possible bundles that player i might demand under the price vector ì p, under all possible utility functions that agree with the sample T . The intersection D T i is convex and compact, as well as continuous in ì p. Also observe that D T i ( ì p) is always non-empty, since there is at least one bundle among the observed samples and the empty bundle which belongs to each of the D(u, ì p, ì e). Let f : [0, 1] k×n → [0, n] k be the excess demand function: f (π ) = i ∈N π (i) − ì 1 (where ì 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ [0, 1] n ). Let z : ∆ n−1 → 2 [0,k] n , be the function z( ì
The function f is linear, therefore z( ì p) is convex and compact, and z is continuous. Using z, we define a function g : ∆ n−1 → 2 ∆ n−1 such that r -th component is given by
By applying Kakutani's fixed-point theorem over g, we get the existence of some ì p * such that ì p * ∈ g( ì p * ). This implies the existence of some
Let r * some non-positive component of f (π ), as argued above; then p * r = p * r (1+ n s=1 max(0, f s ( ì p * ))); this implies that for all r : max(0, f r ( ì p * )) = 0. Therefore, there exists some allocation π * with nonpositive excess demand at ì p * , such that π * , ì p * is consistent with the observed bundles against all possible u ∈ U| i,T for every player i.
Theorem 5.6 uses Kakutani's fixed point theorem; thus, like Theorem 5.5, is not constructive. To conclude, in both cases, we show that a market solution consistent with the samples exists. There is little reason to believe that consistent solutions are easily computable in general; indeed, Othman et al. [2014] show that computing a market outcome in a setting similar to ours is PPAD complete.
PAC Condorcet Winners
Let us conclude with a discussion of learning solution concepts in the voting domain. Consider a set of voters N = {1, . . . , n}, each with a preference order ≻ i over some finite set of candidates C. We say that a candidate c * is a Condorcet winner if for every other candidate c ∈ C, a majority of voters prefer c * to c. The PAC variant of a Condorcet winner would select a candidate c * such that Pr c∼D [a majority of voters prefer c to c * ] < ε. We refer to the problem of finding a Condorcet winner as Ψ Cond . The results below require that given a sample of m candidates from C, we are able to know voter i's preferences with respect to these m candidates. This information can be encoded as a valuation function of i over the candidates (as is the case for hedonic games, see Section 5.2), or the truncated ranking function ≻ i over the m sampled candidates 2 . By definition 4.1, the graph dimension, Sd G (Ψ Cond ), of this problem can be bounded by the largest set of candidates C 0 ∈ C that is G-shattered. More concretely, given a class of preference profiles H, let Ψ Cond (H) be the problem of finding Condorcet winners for profiles in H.
In what follows, we consider the tournament graph: this is a directed graph where the candidates are nodes, and there is an edge from a to b if a beats b in a pairwise election.
T 5.7. For any given class of preference profiles H (assuming more than 1 candidate), the following statements are equivalent:
• There exists a consistent solver for Ψ Cond (H) that always returns a Condorcet winner which belongs to the input of the solver. • Sd G (Ψ Cond ) = 1.
• for every preference profile h ∈ H, the corresponding tournament graph is transitive.
Therefore, for any H satisfying this, there exists a PAC solver for Ψ Cond (H) with sample complexity 1 ϵ lo 1 δ .
P
. If there exists any preference profile h ∈ H for which the tournament graph contains a 3-cycle, then there immediately exist two vertices of that cycle that can be G-shattered. This is true since for every H with more than one candidate, every singleton is shattered. Therefore, Sd G (Ψ Cond ) = 1 if and only if there are no preference profiles with Condorcet 3-cycles, which is equivalent to transitivity. Similarly, the existence of Condorcet winner for every C ′ ∈ C is equivalent to absence of any cycles, which is equivalent to transitivity of the tournament graph.
Two notable families of voter preferences exhibit transitive preferences: single peaked preferences [Brandt et al., 2016, Chapter 2] and single crossing preferences [Gans and Smart, 1996] . Single peaked preferences assume that there is some linear order > over the candidates; for every voter i there is some candidate
Singlecrossing preferences, on the other hand, assume that there is some ordering of the voters > such that for every two candidates c ′ , c ′′ there is some voter i * such that for every i < i * , c ′ ≻ i c ′′ and for every i * ≥ i c ′′ ≻ i c ′ (for further reading see Elkind et al. [2017] An important limitation in voting theory is that Condorcet winners may not always exist, even when the number of candidates is small; this is due to the existence of Condorcet cycles (or Condorcet paradoxes). In fact, as discussed below, whenever the Condorcet winner is known to exist amongst a sample C ′ ∈ C, the problem is equivalent to the argmax problem discussed in Corollary 4.4. However, as shown in Section 4.2, the graph dimension is still useful as a means to estimate, within ±ε with high confidence, the behavior of a candidate in pairwise elections using a small empirical sample.
T 5.9. Let k be the largest number of candidates, such that for some tournament graph in H, every pair among them is part of some 3-cycle. Then Sd G (Ψ Cond ) ≤ lo 2 (k + 2).
. Let us assume that there is a set of size d, C 0 ∈ C, that is shattered. Then by definition of shattering, there exists 2 d different candidates corresponding to every subset of C 0 , such that for f ∈ 2 C 0 there exists a candidate c f ∈ C, such that c 1 ∈ C 0 beats c f in the tournament graph if and only if f (c 1 ) = 1. Let us focus on 2 d −2 of these candidates, corresponding to all non-trivial functions f ∈ 2 C 0 (let us, for now, ignore the functions that assign a constant value (of 0 or 1) to all candidates in C 0 ). Then, for every pair of these functions f 1 and f 2 , there exists a candidate c 1 ∈ C 0 such that f 1 (c 1 ) = 1 and f 2 (c 1 ) = 0, and a candidate c 2 such that f 1 (c 2 ) = 0 and f 2 (c 2 ) = 1. This implies the existence of a directed path of length at most 2 from c f 1 to c f 2 , and vice versa. Since, in a tournament graph, either the edge c f 1 → c f 2 or c f 2 → c f 1 exists, we know that c f 1 and c f 2 are members of some 3-cycle. Since this is true for all such c f 's, we know that 2 d − 2 is less than or equal to largest number of candidates, such that for some tournament graph in H, every pair amongst them is part of some 3-cycle.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our work establishes a general framework for learning solution concepts directly from empirical data. We believe that this connection is useful for several reasons. First, it allows one to formally reason about learnability in the solutions domain: Theorem 4.2 establishes an upper bound on the number of samples needed in order to PAC learn a solution from data; once the sample complexity for that domain is established, all one needs to do is identify an algorithm that finds a solution consistent with the data. As it turns out, natural problems from the economics literature, such as stable coalition structures in hedonic games, Condorcet winners and competitive market equilibria, have a polynomial sample complexity; however, efficiently computing a consistent solution remains a challenging open problem in some cases. While it is likely that finding a consistent solution is easy in practice (e.g. by using ILPs or SAT solvers), identifying algorithms for computing consistent solutions (e.g. finding item prices and an allocation such that no player demands any of the observed bundles of goods) remains an interesting open problem; in the case of market equilibria, we believe that there is no general framework, but rather algorithms that can find consistent market outcomes for specific subclasses of valuations, such as gross-substitutes [Gul and Stacchetti, 1999] or submodular valuations. Similarly, while Theorem 5.3 establishes that identifying PAC stable coalition structures in hedonic games requires a polynomial number of samples, this does not establish the existence of a consistent algorithm and provide such algorithms for two subclasses of hedonic games). Our results focus primarily on the realizable case: there exists some solution that agrees with the samples, and it is a solution for all possible games that could have generated the data; once there is some ambiguity (i.e. the proposed solution will resolve one possible source of the data, but not another), it may be impossible to establish a good data-driven solution. Identifying problem classes for which such a universal solver exists is an interesting challenge. We also mostly focus on exact solutions, rather than approximations. However, our model can easily accommodate approximate notions by assimilating the approximation guarantee into the loss function; this can be done by adopting a probably mostly approximately correct notion of learning, as proposed by Balcan and Harvey [2011] . Further afield, our model can be generalized in a similar manner to that of the PAC model. As discussed in Section 3, the key difference between our solution-based model and the PAC model lies in the fact that our loss function can depend on the underlying game structure (the structure of the function generating the labels), whereas in the PAC model, loss is dependent only on the point and its label. The PAC model can be extended to regression, clustering, density estimation and stochastic optimization [Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2010] ; thus, extending our model in the manner described in [Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2010] would result in potentially interesting analyses of learning in game-theoretic domains. We upper-bound the sample complexity of learning solution concepts using a generalization of the graph dimension; however, graph dimension does not necessarily offer a lower bound. Daniely et al. [2011] use the Natarajan dimension [Natarajan, 1989] to prove lower bounds on the sample complexity in multi-class learning. While one can generalize the Natarajan dimension to our setting, proving that it lower bounds the sample complexity of solution learning is an open problem. Learning global properties is another important direction in learning solutions. There is a growing body of literature on sample-based auction design and function optimization (see Section 1.2); however, there is no general theory of learning global properties for game-theoretic solution concepts. There is a connection between this problem and property testing [Ron, 2008] ; however, exploring this connection further and establishing provable learning guarantees in our setting is an open problem. P C 4.6. Part 1 (Worst-case Agnostic PAC Solving) Let A m : (X × Y) m → S be an ERM Solver such that for any sample of m ≥ m UC (ε, δ ) points T = (x i , i ) m i =1 , outputs a solution A(T ) ∈ S that minimizes max ∈G | T L T ( , A(T )).
Let s * ∈ S be a solution such that it minimizes max 
